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The Demand for State and Local
Government Employees
By RONALD G. EHRENBERG*
During the 1953-70 period, state and
local government employment grew faster
than total employment, rising from 8.6
percent to 14.0 percent of total employ-
ment on payrolls of nonagricultural estab-
lishments. While much of the rise was due
to the growth of educational employment
(145 percent), state and local noneduca-
tional employment also grew significantly
faster (79 percent) than employment in the
private nonagricultural economy (33 per-
cent). Indeed, several noneducational em-
ployment categories have grown at rates
approaching or exceeding that of educa-
tional employment in recent years (Table
1). By 1980, state and local government
employment is projected by the Bureau of
Labor Statistics to increase further to
15.9 percent of total nonagricultural pay-
roll employment.^
Interest in the determinants of the level
of such employment within a state and its
allocation across functional categories is
more than academic. Recently, fears have
been expressed that the growing strength
of public employee unions, their increased
militancy, and the trend toward collective
bargaining rights with respect to wage
issues, will lead to inflationary wage in-
creases in the sector and aggravate the
* Associate professor of economics, University of
Massachusetts. Without implicating them for what
remains, I am grateful to Orley Ashenfelter, James
Kindah], a referee, and the editor for their comments on
earlier versions of the paper. The research was supported
by a faculty research grant from the Manpower Ad-
ministration, U.S. Department of Labor and the ma-
terial presented here draws from my larger study
(1972), prepared for that organization.
' See Manpower Report, Tables C-1, E-11; Handbook
of Labor Statistics, Tables 38, 100; Public Employment
(various issues).
financial problems facing state and local
governments.^ These fears are explicitly
based upon the assumption that public
services are essential and consequently
that the demand for public employees °is
wage inelastic. To many, the logical con-
clusion then drawn is that limitations
should be placed on the collective bargain-
ing rights of these groups.'
To date, however, no estimates have
been presented of the wage elasticities of
demand for public employees and conse-
quently no quantitative discussion of the
strength of the market forces, which might
prevent such increases, has occurred. To
the extent that state and local government
employee unions value both the wage and
employment levels of their members, high
wage elasticities coupled with projected
relatively slower rates of growth of em-
ployment demand would help to moderate
the size of wage increases which they will
seek in the future.
One can easily think of possibilities for
substituting capital for labor in the provi-
sion of public services (for example, police
patrol cars) and for substituting private
for public provision (for example, private
security agencies). Moreover, given the
limited resources which state and local
' Harry Cohany and Lucretia Dewey, Sheila White'
and Sheila Weissbror present descriptions of these
trends. Table 1 presents data which indicate that both
over the 1961-70 and 1965-70 periods, state and local
government employees' wages have increased more
rapidly than wages in the private sector. However, as
suggested by the editor, the past relative inflation of
public employees' wages was probably due to the rapid
growth of employment demand in the sector and
unrelated to the wage elasticities of demand
' See, for example, Harry Wellington and Ralph
Winter.
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TABLE 1—TOTAL PERCENTAGE CHANGES FULL-TIME EQUIVALENT STATE AND LOCAL
GOVERNMENT EMPLOYMENT AND MONTHLY PAYROLL PER MAN, BY FUNCTION
Category
Education
Highway
Public Welfare
Hospitals
Health
Police
Fire Protection
Sewerage
Other Sanitation
Parks and Recreation
Natural Resources
Correction
Libraries
Employment Security
Administration
Financial Administration
General Control
Local Utilities
Private-Nonfarm
Private-Manufacturing
Employment
1965-70
27.6
3.4
47.t
18.6
36.0
29.0
12.1
10.9
11.4
17.2
12.6
28.0
9.9
18.0
12.6
31.6
7.0
14.2
7.4
1961-70
60.5
10.6
99.5
38.3
55.3
44.9
18.4
26.4
17.9
29.8
23.6
54.6
N.A.
N.A.
19.0
45.4
14.8
27.9
•18.8
Payroll
1965-70
41.8
38.5
41.6
51.4
43.6
43.0
47.7
37.4
37.7
34.4
41.2
44.9
42.2
33.6
41.1
38.2
38.0
31.4
28.7
Per Man
1961-70
66.5
61.6
68.2
74.4
68.6
75.8
74.9
59.0
59.6
56.7
65.3
76.6
N.A.
N.A.
61.3
62.8
76.2
50.5
44.8
Source: Derived from data found in various issues of Public Employment and Handbook oj
Labor Statistics. The private figures are percentage changes in total payroll employment
and average hourly earnings of nonsupervisory employees.
governments can command, an increase in
the relative price of a public service should
lead to a substitution against that service.
Thus, it is not obvious, a priori, that the
wage elasticities of demand for all cate-
gories of state and local government em-
ployees are inelastic.
The primary purpose of this paper is to
present empirical estimates of the wage
elasticities of demand for different cate-
gories of state and local government em-
ployees. The employment demand equa-
tions that are estimated are derived from a
utility maximization model of state and
local government behavior. After present-
ing this model in the first section, we next
briefly discuss the data used in the study.
The structural system of demand equa-
tions is then estimated using pooled time-
series and cross-section information, with
annual individual state data as the units
of observation. A number of alternative
estimation methods are used in the analy-
sis. Parameter estimates obtained from the
model are utilized in the final section to
simulate the disemployment effects of postu-
lated future relative wage increases for
individual classes of state and local gov-
ernment employees, as well as increases for
all classes relative to the private sector.
Our estimates indicate that statistically
significant negative wage elasticities of de-
mand exist for almost all functional cate-
gories of state and local government em-
ployees. However, these elasticities do ap-
pear to be inelastic and consequently the
simulated disemployment effects are quite
small. Thus, while there is evidence that
state and local government decision mak-
ers respond to market forces in choosing
their employment portfolios, these re-
sponses do not appear to be sufficiently
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strong to limit the size of real wage in-
creases which state and local government
employees may seek in the future.
I. Theoretical Structure
Abstracting from the myriad of state
and local government bodies within a
state, we consider a single decision-making
unit which is assumed to determine the
allocation of state resources between public
and private production and also the per
capita level and functional distribution of
state and local government employment.
Employing a "utility-tree" approach, let
the utility function of this unit be written
as
(1)
u
privately
produced
goods and
.services
publicly
produced
goods and
.services
The decision-making body is assumed to
derive utility from the various categories
of public services, with the per capita ser-
vice flow from each category being propor-
tional to the per capita category employ-
ment level. At each point in time, for any
function, the factor of proportion is as-
sumed constant across states. Hence, we
are implicitly assuming no quality differ-
entials within an employment category
across states and, since state price indices
for the "cost of capital" do not exist, we
have also ignored the possibility of sub-
stituting capital for labor.
Specifically, suppose that the branch
utility function (F*) is of the form,^
* A speciftc member of this class of utility functions is
the Stone-Geary utility function.
FMi bi M2 b2(2) V^ = VA , , . . . ,
LP P P P
P p\
Mj > bj for all j
Here, Mk is the full-time equivalent state
and local government employment level of
the ^th functional category, bk is the mini-
mum required number of type k employ-
ees, P is the state population, and there are
n functional employment categories.
The minimum required employment
levels are introduced because state and
local government decision making is often
alleged to be conducted on an incremental
basis, with previous departmental budgets
or employment levels taken as given.* To
allow for this possibility we assume, in a
manner analogous to that of Pollack and
Wales, that the minimum required number
of employees in a category is proportional
to the lagged category employment level.
(3) 0 < at < 1,
k= \,2,. . . ,n
Richard Stone, Richard Parks, and Robert Pollack and
Terrance Wales utilize this utility function to derive
and estimate consumer demand functions.
Employment decisions are strictly incre-
mental if the ak are all unity, while the
entire employment portfolio is a decision
variable if all the a* are zero. Intermediate
values indicate that the category employ-
ment levels can be cut to some extent. An
interpretation of (2) and (3) is then as fol-
lows: For any level of budgeted funds, the
decision-making body first makes expendi-
tures for the minimum required numbers
of employees and then with the remaining
budgeted funds, chooses the increments to
these employment levels so as to maximize
' Ira Sharkansky and the references cited therein
present evidence that agencies are seldom cut below
their previous levels of appropriations. However this in
itself is not evidence of incremental budgeting, for with
growing state and local government budgets it is con-
ceivable that the appropriate marginal conditions would
dictate that all agencies be expanded anyway.
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the branch utility function (F*) which
depends only on the per capita increments.
Suppose that the decision makers seek
to maximize the "higher-level" utility
function (1) subject to a constraint that
involves total available resources in the
state, here assumed to be a function of per
capita personal income and per capita
grants from the federal government, and
the prices of the various individual pub-
licly and privately produced services. If
we further assume that the higher-level
utility function is strongly separable,
which requires that the marginal rates of
substitution between different categories
of public services be independent of "con-
sumption" levels of privately produced
services, then Robert Strotz has shown
that the decision makers will optimally
follow a two-stage process.^ First the ex-
penditure levels for each aggregated branch
(public vs. private) will be selected with
the resources allocated to each branch
being a function only of the total resources
available and the aggregate branch price
indices. Then expenditure levels for spe-
cific commodities, in either the public or
private branch, will be determined as func-
tions of the total own branch expenditure
level and the specific prices of all com-
modities within the branch alone.
If we assume that the per capita total
state and local government employment
budget in a state is approximately propor-
tional to the per capita "public branch
allocation," the above suggests that it is
reasonable to specify the per capita total
employment budget (B/P) as being deter-
mined by,'
' As we have already indicated in our introduction,
the strong separability assumption is not strictly valid as
many services produced in the public sector have viable
private substitutes. Furthermore, privately produced
but publicly purchased services would be included in
branch A. Nevertheless, the assumption is useful in
that it provides an analytic foundation for (4).
' Decision makers are viewed in (4) as having suffi-
cient flexibility so that even grants tied to specific func-
tions serve to increase the total employment budget,
(4) log {B/P) = 5o + 5i log (RW)
Here Y/P is per capita personal income,
G/P is per capita grants from the federal
government to state and local governments
in the state and RW is a measure of the
average relative cost of publicly produced
to privately produced goods and services.
For empirical purposes RW is defined as
the ratio of average monthly earnings of
state and local government employees to
the comparable figure for manufacturing
production workers in the state.
Once the per capita total employment
budget is determined, the decision makers
choose the per capita level and functional
distribution of state and local government
employment by maximizing the branch
utility function (2) subject to (3) and the
constraint that the total employment
budget be exhausted.
(5)
-h) = B -
k=l
Wk is the monthly payroll cost per em-
ployee of the /feth category. Assuming that
the customary regularity conditions hold
for (2), its maximization subject to (3) and
(5) yields a general system of category
employment demand equations.
(6) M) W. w«
\
i = 1 , 2 , . . . , «
In our empirical work (6) is approxi-
rather than only the specific category budget. More-
over, matching grants are assumed to have only income
and not price effects. A long literature exists (for ex-
ample, Edward Gramlich and David Smyth) which
neither conclusively support nor refute these assump-
tions. Federal grants are also treated as being exogenous
for our purposes. Our formulation is dictated by data
considerations and the particular functional form is
chosen for analytic convenience.
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mated by the following system of log-
linear employment demand equations.*
II. The Data
(7) log
p p ) " '
lilogiB- t.
\ *=1
+62
R=l
To avoid problems of severe multi-
collinearity, (7) excludes all wage variables
except the employment category's own
wage. Furthermore, since it is erroneous to
specify that the relative importance of the
various services are constant across states
or within a state over time, the system
includes as explanatory variables those
sociodemographic variables (SDR) that
are expected to influence the decision
makers' tastes for the various services.' On
the basis of data availability and prelimi-
nary experimentation, the variables uti-
lized are the state population density
{SD\), the proportion of the state popula-
tion ages 5-17 {SD2), and the proportion
of the state population over age 65 (SD3).
The system of w-f-1 equations contained in
(4) and (7) is estimated in Section III.*"
' The specific utility function found in fn, 4 leads
directly to the system of demand equations in (7), with
the further restrictions that 6iy= — 1 and 62, = 1 for ally.
Since we are primarily interested in ascertaining the
magnitude of the wage and employment budget elas-
ticities of demand, these restrictions are not imposed in
the estimation and the specific functional form of the
utility function is not assumed a priori. However, we
emphasize that (7) must then be regarded only as an
approximation to a true system of demand equations.
Note that if government employers face positively
sloped labor supply curves, the wage elasticities esti-
mated from (7) will be biased in a positive direction,
Orley Ashenfelter presents evidence, however, that the
aggregate supply of labor to the state and local sector is
highly elastic and thus this bias is likely to be small,
' For example, we would expect the age distribution
of the population to effect the relative importance to
the decision makers of educational employment. Simi-
larly population density will influence the relative im-
portance of police employment.
'" I also estimated a variant of (7) which substituted
Published data allow us to consider
eleven functional categories of employees
and to pool time-series and cross-section
information, with annual individual state
data during the 1958-69 period as the
units of observation." Full-time equivalent
state and local government employment
has been reported by function and state
since 1953, however the number of func-
tional categories reported declined grad-
ually from nineteen in 1969 to ten in 1953.
Thus increasing the length of the time
period under consideration can be done
only at the expense of aggregating cate-
gories.
The choice of 1958 as the initial year
was made on pragmatic grounds; by the
availability of data on per capita federal
grants to state and local governments.
Referring to Table 1, this required that
sewerage and other sanitation employment
be aggregated into a sanitation category
and financial administration employment
be included with general control. Due to
the similarity of functions performed by
the two categories in each of these aggre-
gate groups there appeared to be obvious
reporting errors over time within several
states (for example, the ratio of financial
administration to general control employ-
ment in a state fluctuated widely over
time, while the total of the two and their
relative wage remained fairly constant).
Hence both of these aggregations appeared
to be desirable on a priori grounds. Finally,
I constructed a miscellaneous all others
category that included parks and recrea-
tion, correction, library, employment se-
the category wage relative to the average wage for all
state and local government employees in the state
(WJ/WT) for the category own wage (Wi). The esti-
mates were similar in nature to those obtained using
specification (7) and are omitted here for brevity. See
Ehrenberg, chs, 4 and 5,
" The variables used in the study are constructed
from published data found in the U.S, government pub-
lications which are listed in the references.
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curity administration, local utility, state
liquor store, and all other state and local
government employees not explicitly con-
tained in any of the categories listed in
Table 1.'^
All of the variables expressible in dollar
terms were deflated by the national con-
sumer price index to obtain real values;
unfortunately no individual state price
indices exist and we were unable to control
for interstate price differences. The aver-
age monthly payroll cost per man variable
was derived by dividing full-time equiva-
lent employment into total monthly pay-
roll. In 1964 the reported full-time equiva-
lent employment variable was rounded to
the nearest 100 employees, which induced
large errors in the wage variable for small
states and/or relatively small functional
employment categories. Consequently, data
from 1964 was eliminated from the sam-
ple. Finally, no data was reported for
Alaska or Hawaii in 1958 and 1959. The
final sample thus consists of 546 state-year
observations.
III. Empirical Estimates
This section presents estimates of the
demand for state and local government
employees. We first briefly discuss esti-
mates of the derived reduced form model,
when the minimum required employment
level for each class is assumed to be zero,
and consider the legitimacy of aggregating
the data across years. Maintaining the
same assumption, we next present esti-
mates of the structural model utilizing the
pooled data. Finally, the incremental bud-
geting model is estimated under a restric-
tive set of assumptions.
" For a description of the type of functions performed
by employees in each category and an attempt to use a
clustering procedure to determine the appropriate ag-
gregated groups, see Ehrenberg, ch, 3, A more complete
description of the methods of, and problems involved in
constructing the variables utilized in the study is also
found there.
Estimates of the Reduced Form and
Tests for Aggregation Bias
Initially we assume that the minimum
required employment level for each class
of employees is zero; that the decision
maker is free to choose the entire employ-
ment portfolio each period. Substituting
(4) into (7) yields the reduced form system
of demand equations. This system was
estimated in three different ways by ordi-
nary least squares: First, separately for
each year in the sample using cross-section
data. Second, using the pooled data for all
years. Third, using the pooled data with a
set of zero-one dummy variables included
to allow the intercept term to vary over
In general, the estimated coefficients of
the economic variables in the individual
year cross-sections, especially the wage
elasticities, were statistically insignificant.
In those cases that a particular coefficient
was significant, it tended to vary widely
across years. This clearly points out the
dangers inherent in drawing conclusions
from a single year's cross-section study.
As expected the estimates based upon
the pooled data were vastly superior in
terms of the signs and statistical signifi-
cance of the key economic variables.'^
However one may question the legitimacy
of aggregating the data across years. Using
the sum of squared residuals obtained from
the individual year and pooled regressions,
/^-statistics were calculated to test for the
possibility of aggregation bias,^ ^ Specifi-
" The intercept dummy variables are included to cap-
ture intertemporal productivity variations, since if the
productivity of state and local government employees
varies over time, the demand for each category will also
vary, ceteris paribus. Inasmuch as their inclusion did not
significantly alter the estimated wage elasticities of
demand, the intercept shift variables are not utilized in
the subsequent analysis,
" For brevity, these estimates are not presented here
since an analysis of them would be quite similar to that
of the structural estimates.
" See Frank Fisher,
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cally we consider two null hypotheses here:
(1) That the entire set of reduced
form coefficients is identical across years
for each category.
(2) That the entire set of reduced
form coefficients except the intercept is
identical across years for each category.
For six of the eleven functional cate-
gories the null hypothesis that the entire
set of reduced form coefficients is equal
across years was rejected. Furthermore,
the rejection was not due solely to the
intercept term varying; in four of these six
cases null hypothesis (2) was also rejected.
For pragmatic reasons once again, we
will continue to utilize the pooled data in
what follows. However, our results must
be qualified by noting that for about half
of the categories information will be lost
by the aggregation. Our simulations in the
next section will be based in these cases
upon estimated average elasticities which
may differ from the marginal elasticities
which we would obtain if significant coeffi-
cients could be derived from the individual
year cross-.section regressions.
Structural Estimates—
No Incremental Budgeting
To estimate the structural model, we
first estimate (4) to obtain an estimated
per capita total employment budget
(B/P) and then use this as an instrumental
variable in the estimation of (7). More-
over, if the employment budget is fixed, a
positive residual in spending for one func-
tional category must be offset by a nega-
tive residual in some other category. Due
to the contemporaneous correlation of
residuals across equations in (7), one
would expect three-stage least squares
estimates (3SLS) to be asymptotically
more efficient than two-stage least squares
estimates and the former method is used
Utilizing the pooled data, estimation of
(4) yielded the following (where the num-
bers in parentheses are absolute lvalues).
(8) log {B/P) = - 4.120 + .315 log {RW)
(21.48) (7.87)
+ .222 log {G/P)
(17.32)
(28.60)
= .754
" Two-stage least squares estimates of (7) differed
only marginally.
The less than unitary elasticity for RW
indicates that, ceteris paribus, an increase
in the average wage of public employees
relative to private sector wages will cause
a disemployment impact as the per capita
total employment budget would increase
by a smaller percentage. As indicated in
Section IV, however, this impact may be
partially offset if the resulting adjustments
in the labor market lead to an increase in
per capita income. Furthermore, to simu-
late the estimated impact on each cate-
gory's employment level, requires estima-
tion of the complete system.
The iSLS estimates of (7) obtained
under the assumption that the minimum
required employment levels are all zero,
are presented in Table 2. '^ The own wage
elasticities are negative and statistically
significant in all cases, save for the miscel-
laneous all other category.^* Except for the
public welfare category these elasticities
are all significantly less than unity. Thus,
as conjectured by many, the partial wage
elasticities of demand for public employees
do appear to be primarily inelastic.'' Note
however, that even the "essential services"
police and fire protection have significant,
" The standard errors of these estimates are asymp-
totic estimates, hence the /-tests are only asymp-
totically valid and should be interpreted heuristically.
" Given the heterogeneous nature of the functions
performed by employees in the latter category, the
insignificant elasticity is not unexpected.
" They are partial elasticities because they do not
consider the impact on the employment budget equa-
tion of an increase in a category's wage.
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TABLE 2—35Z,5 ESTIMATES—POOLED DATA"
LOG-LINEAR EQUATIONS
Dependent variable
(Mi/P)
Education
Highway
PubUc Welfare
Hospital
Health
Police
Fire
Sanitation
Natural Resources
General Control
All Other
Wj
- .425
(8.89)''
- .594
(11.55)
-1.001
(10.58)
- .410
(9.86)
- .279
(4.08)
- .281
(5.73)
-.277
(5.65)
- .504
(7.55)
- .530
(5.76)
- .316
(7.49)
.067
(1.18)
(B/P)
.730
(16.61)
.441
(8.04)
1.569
(19.25)
.571
(7.87)
.684
(9.06)
.795
(16.08)
.850
(12.95)
.593
(6.45)
.282
(3.19)
.820
(19.53)
.740
(12.68)
SDl
- . 0 5 5
(10.98)
- . 1 6 0
(27.48)
.029
(2.93)
.058
(5.64)
.064
(11.35)
.133
(15.39)
.141
(12.25)
- .334
(36.21)
-.072
(14.23)
.008
(1.16)
SD2
.183
(3.95)
SD3
.289
(6.72)
.353
(8.67)
-.361
(9.88)
Notes: Mj/P = per capita full-time equivalent state and local government employees of
category j .
G/P=peT capita federal grants to state and local governments, in real terms.
Y/P = per capita personal income in real terms.
B/P = per capita total employment budget for state and local government em-
ployees, in real terms.
W; = average monthly payroll cost per full-time employee in category j , in real
terms.
RW = Ta.tio of average monthly payroll cost per man of all full-time state and
local government employees to average monthly earnings of manufacturing
production workers.
SDl = population density
5D2 = proportion of the population ages 5-17.
5Z)3 = proportion of the population, age 65 and up.
Sources: Derived from data in U.S. Bureau of Census, Estimates of the Popidation of
States by Age, CRP Series P-25 (various issues); Government Finances (various issues);
Public Employment (various issues); Statistical A bstract of the United States, 1969; Hand-
book of Labor Statistics 1970; Survey of Current Business (Apr. 1965, Apr. 1970).
' The number of state-year observations for all equations is 546; 11 years (1958-63,
65-69) times 50 states minus the observations for Alaska and Hawaii in 1958 and 1959.
'' Absolute ^values are shown in parentheses.
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although small, wage elasticities of de-
mand. The estimates of the per capita
employment budget elasticities are all
positive and statistically significant.
With respect to the sociodemographic
variables, population density appears to
be negatively related to education, high.-
way, natural resource, and general control
employment. The latter relationship may
reflect the substitution of capital for labor
that is possible in large scale clerical and
administrative operations. This variable
is also positively related to public welfare,
hospital, police, fire, and sanitation em-
ployment. Several plausible factors relat-
ing to the relationship between population
density and the costs and benefits from
these services may explain the signs of
these coefficients.
As expected, the proportion of the popu-
lation between the ages of 5 and 17 is posi-
tively related to educational employment
and the proportion of the population older
than age 65 is positively related to public
welfare and hospital employment. The
negative relationship between the propor-
tion of the population older than age 65
and health employment may be due to the
preventive nature of many of the services
in this category (for example, school im-
munization programs); services which are
not directed primarily at the aged.^ "
™ Two extensions of the analysis that were conducted
warrant brief reporting: First, regardless of whether
state and local government decision making is actually
governed by an explicit utility maximization framework,
it seems desirable to use an econometric approach in
which the sum of the estimated payroll expenditures
across categories adds up to the estimated total em-
ployment budget. This can be expressed as the Engel
aggregation condition, that the sum of the per capita
employment budget (B/P) elasticities of demand,
weighted by their respective category proportions of
total payroll expenditures, be unity. Formal F-tests of
this restriction for the estimates of (7) reported in
Table 2, utilizing 1969 national average category expen-
diture weights, indicated that the weighted sum was sig-
nificantly less than unity. Consequently, the system (7)
was reestimated using a restricted 3SLS technique (see
Henri Theil), with the Engel aggregation condition
imposed as a constraint. The restricted wage elasticities
Structural Estimates—
Incremental Budgeting
To identify the at coefficients that ap-
pear in (7) requires either a method which
allows non-linear constraints to be placed
on parameters across equations or an itera-
tive procedure. Software limitations pre-
vented the former and to iterate over eleven
coefficients searching for maximum-likeli-
hood sets of estimates would have proven
prohibitively expensive. Consequently, we
adopt a second best procedure and assume
that the minimum required proportion of
last period's per capita employment level
{ai) is the same for all functions (a). While
this assumption might be justified by
arguing that all agencies apply equal pres-
sure on decision makers to preserve their
sizes, its main justification is in its analytic
convenience.
Because the system (7) is log-linear, one
cannot shift the {aMj~^/P) variable in
each equation to the right-hand side and
thus the dependent variable will vary as a
varies. Hence, we were unable to follow a
procedure similar to that used by other
investigators, of choosing the value of a
which minimizes the sum of squared re-
siduals in (7) across all eleven equations,
of demand differed only marginally from the un-
restricted estimates, except the elasticity for educational
employment which doubled in magnitude. The employ-
ment budget elasticity for education also increased sub-
stantially; intuitively this was expected to occur as the
expenditure weight on education is over 50 percent. The
employment budget elasticities for the other categories
increased only marginally.
Second, the dangers inherent in inferring time-series
responses from pooled cross-section time-series data are
well known. While the lack of degrees of freedom gen-
erally led to statistically insignificant coefficients when
the system (4), (7) was estimated separately for each
individual state using the short time-series 1958-63,
65-69; tliese statistically insignificant individual state
time-series coefficients were used to perform non-
parametric tests to ascertain if the wage elasticities of
demand for each category appeared to be "primarily"
negative as postulated. Sucli tests (Ehrenberg, ch. 4)
supported this hypothesis for most of the categories.
See Alexander Mood and Franklin Graybill, p. 403-25
for the basis of the nonparametric test used.
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TABLE 3—
Dependent variable
Education
Highway
Public Welfare
Hospital
Health
Police
Fire
Sanitation
Natural Resources
General Control
All Others
•3SLS ESTIMATES—INCREMENTAL BUDGETING MODEL"
LOG-LINEAR EQUATIONS
a= .5
•) Wj
- .175
(3.15)"
- .635
(14.23)
- .338
(3.65)
- .516
(7.42)
- .300
(4.27)
- .023
(.45)
- .240
(3.37)
- .539
(7.54)
- .602
(6.37)
- .099
(1.64)
.261
(4.39)
(.B/P)^
.037
(6.01)
.394
(8.02)
.888
(10.49)
.223
(2.41)
.608
(7.56)
.451
(8.23)
.638
(8.11)
.239
(2.49)
.278
(3.12)
.480
(8.32)
.320
(4.68)
SDl
- .085
(11.09)
- .176
(25.54)
- .008
(.64)
.038
(2.80)
.028
(3.77)
.098
(8.59)
.131
(9.56)
- .343
(28.57)
- .101
(12.36)
- .023
(2.41)
SD2
.170
(2.43)
SD3
.452
(7.98)
.379
(6.74)
- .405
(8.29)
° For number of jabservations, sources of data, and definitions, see Table 2.
•> In this table {B/P) is used as a short-hand notation for
(B/P)-.5
' Absolute i-values in parentheses.
time periods and states.^^ Rather, 3SLS
estimates of the system were derived for a
set of, values of a and it was heuristically
determined that the minimum required
proportion (a) lies in the range 0.0 to
0.5.^ ^ For values of a which fall in this
range, disemployment effects of postulated
future relative wage increases are simu-
lated in the next section. Since these esti-
mates are tolerably stable over the range
"' See, for example, Stone.
i-i
of values, it is unnecessary for us to choose
a "statistically optimal" estimate for a.
For comparison purposes, estimates of
(7) when a was assumed to equal .5, are
presented in Table 3.^' In general as a in-
creased from 0 to .5, the employment
budget elasticities decreased; however,
there was no uniform pattern of change for
the own wage coefficients.
^ The system (7) was estimated as a varied from 0.0
to 0.9 in steps of 0.1. Two criteria were used in our
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IV. Implications For Public Policy
The impact on per capita full-time
equivalent state and local government
employment in each functional category
of an increase in the category real wage
can be simulated using the parameter esti-
mates described in the previous section.
We consider two cases
A. The real wage of a functional
category of state and local government
employees increases relative to all other
employees' real wages and nonlabor real
personal income.
B. The real wages of all state and
local government employees increase pro-
portionately, relative to all other employ-
ees' real wages and nonlabor real personal
income.
For both cases, we calculate the total
own wage elasticity of demand for each
functional employment category, which
consists of two components. First, the
direct partial elasticity, based upon the
estimated own wage (W,) elasticities ob-
tained from the individual category em-
ployment demand equations. Second, the
indirect effect, which operates through the
impacts of an increase in the class wage on
the relative cost of publicly to privately
produced services (RW) and on per capita
personal income (Y/P) in the per capita
total employment budget equation. Since
the per capita total employment budget
(B/P) tends to increase due to these im-
heuristic evaluation of which values of a yielded plaus-
ible estimates. First, as observations were eliminated
from the sample when Mj/P—aM\~^/P was negative
for any category, what proportion of the original num-
ber of observations remained in the sample for each
value of a? Second, for each value, what proportion of
the wage and employment budget elasticities were sta-
tistically significant and of the anticipated sign? Details
of this analysis are also found in Ehrenberg, ch. 4.
" It is easily seen that iiy and % in (7) represent the
steady-state wage and employment budget elasticities,
respectively.
'* Several additional cases are considered in Ehren-
berg, ch. 5.
pacts, as long as an employment category
has a positive employment budget elas-
ticity, its total wage elasticity will be
smaller in absolute value than the partial
elasticity.^^ Moreover, ceteris paribus, the
larger the partial wage elasticity, the
smaller the employment budget elasticity,
and the smaller the share of the total em-
ployment payroll spent on the category, the
larger in absolute value will be the total
wage elasticity. Hence, the larger will be
the disemployment impact that would
result from an increase in the class wage.
Differentiating the system (4), (7) with
respect to the real wage of each class, one
can derive formulae for the total own wage
elasticities of demand for the two cases
considered.^* In addition to the parameter
estimates obtained from the estimation of
(4) and (7) these elasticities are seen to
depend upon the fraction of the employ-
ment budget initially spent on each cate-
gory, the proportion of personal income
earned by state and local goverment em-
ployees, the ratio of per capita total state
and local government employment lagged
^ An increase in state and local government em-
ployees' wages would lead to the following set of adjust-
ments in the labor market; a decline in state and local
government employment (the impact which we seek to
estimate) and an increase in the level of unemployment
and/or an increase in the supply of labor to the private
sector, resulting in lower wages but greater employment
there. To the extent that private sector wages and em-
ployment do not change (perhaps due to wages which
are inflexible in a downward direction), per capita per-
sonal income would increase as long as the demand for
state and local government employees is wage inelastic.
Our simulations ignore the adjustments that would
occur in private sector wages and employment (i.e.,
they assume a private sector wage elasticity of unity),
and may to a minor degree overstate the impact of pub-
lic employee wage changes on per capita personal
income. As a consequence, the total elasticities pre-
sented in Table 4 may be slightly biased towards zero.
However, since the partial elasticities provide an abso-
lute upper bound for the total elasticities, our main con-
clusions would be unaltered. The simulations also as-
sume that per capita federal grants are unrelated to
state and local government employees' wages.
^ The formulae and their derivations are available
upon request from the author.
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one year to the current total, and the com-
parable ratio for per capita employment
in each category. National average values
for each of these variables in 1969 are used
in the simulation.
Substitution of these values and the
necessary parameter estimates obtained
from the estimation of (4) and (7) into the
derived formulae, yields empirical esti-
mates of the total own wage elasticities of
demand. These are calculated for seven
different sets of estimates of (7).^ ^ In
Table 4, for each functional category and
case, we indicate the interval over which
the seven sets of estimates varied. It
should be emphasized that these do not
represent statistical confidence intervals,
rather they indicate only the sensitivity
of the total elasticities to the value of a
utilized. The short-run elasticities reported
in Table 4 refer to the impact in the first
year, while the long-run elasticities in-
dicate the steady-state solutions. The
two are identical when a = 0.
Considering first case A, in which em-
ployees in a functional category succeed
in pushing up their real wages relative to
all other employees and nonlabor personal
income, the estimates appear to be toler-
ably stable for each category, except
education and pubhc welfare. Moreover
in all cases, save perhaps public welfare,
there is no doubt that the total own wage
elasticities are inelastic. A 5 percent in-
crease in the real wage of a class would,
ceteris paribus, decrease per capita full-
time equivalent in the class by less than 5
percent. Furthermore, since population
growth has averaged more than 1 percent
a year, the category decline in total full-
time-equivalent employment would be
even smaller.
Due to the fact that an increase in any
" These estimates correspond to values of a assumed
equal to 0 (Table 2), 0—restricted estimates, .1, .2, ,3,
and ,4 (all not presented here for brevity), and ,5
(Table 3),
TABLE 4—DISEMPLOYMENT JMPACT SIMULATIONS:
INTERVAL ESTIMATES OF TOTAL
OWN WAGE ELASTICITIES
Category
A.
Education
Highway
Public Welfare
Hospital
Health
Police
Fire
Sanitation
Natural Resources
General Control
All Others
B.
Education
Highway
Public Welfare
Hospital
Health
Police
Fire
Sanitation
Natural Resources
General Control
All Others
Short
- ,56,
- ,59,
-1 ,13,
- ,46,
- ,31,
- .31,
- .28,
- ,57,
- ,59,
- ,34,
.03,
- ,36,
- ,42,
- ,46,
- .19,
- ,02,
,00,
,03,
- ,29,
- ,44,
- ,02,
,30,
Run
- , 0 9
- , 3 2
- , 1 8
- . 2 6
- , 1 6
- , 0 2
- , 1 2
- , 2 8
- , 2 9
- , 0 5
,16
,04
- , 0 4
,46
- , 0 6
,28
,30
.34
- . 0 7
- , 0 9
,28
,42
Long
- ,57,
- .64,
-1,13,
- ,51,
- ,32,
- ,35,
- ,31,
- ,56,
- ,60,
- ,34,
,30,
- .36,
- ,48,
- ,46,
- ,42,
- ,06,
,00,
- ,03,
- ,45,
- ,49,
- ,03,
,30,
Run
- , 0 8
- , 4 4
- . 3 3
- . 3 0
- . 2 6
- , 0 1
- , 2 3
- , 4 0
- . 3 9
- , 0 9
,29
,02
- . 2 6
- , 0 0
- , 1 5
- , 0 1
,15
,13
- . 2 5
- , 1 4
,08
,45
class wage increases the sum of the com-
mitted employment expenditures, all par-
tial cross-wage elasticities of demand are
negative in the short-run for case A. How-
ever, in most cases the magnitudes of
these partial cross wage-elasticities are ex-
tremely small, often less than —.001.^*
Furthermore, when we consider the in-
direct impacts through the total employ-
ment budget equation, the short-run total
cross-wage elasticities are seen to be pri-
marily positive and in the long-run they
are all positive.
Turning to case B, in which all state
and local government employees' real
wages increase proportionately relative to
all other employees' wages and nonlabor
personal income, the estimated disem-
" For example, when a = .5, only 6 of 110 partial
cross-wage elasticities of demand were greater than ,1
in absolute value with all referring to employment
responses to changes in the education wage.
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ployment effects are now all smaller. Inas-
much as a proportionate state and local
government employee wage increase re-
moves the incentive to substitute across
functional categories, this result was ex-
expected. Those elasticities that remain
negative are all inelastic; however, several
of the intervals now contain zero and a
few of the estimated elasticities are even
always positive. For example, in the long
run, police, fire, general control, and the
miscellaneous all other category, all ap-
pear to have positive total wage elasticities
of demand.
These results suggest that while state
and local governments do respond to
market forces in choosing their employ-
ment portfolios, these market forces do not
appear to be sufficiently strong to limit
the size of real wage increases which state
and local government employees may
seek in the future. They also suggest that
employees in each functional category
have a stake in the economic well-being of
members of all the other categories, as
each category can minimize the potential
employment losses of their members by
seeking to increase the real wages of all
categories, rather than merely their own
real wage. Consequently, continual careful
consideration, on both sides, should be
given to the evolving structure of collec-
tive bargaining in this
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